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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-OLIVER AND THE OPEN FIELDS
DOCTRINE-Oliver v. United States, - U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 1735
(1984).
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, uncertainty has arisen concerning the vitality
of the open fields doctrine developed in Hester v. United States.'
In Hester, the United States Supreme Court adopted a per se rule
that the protections of the fourth amendment do not apply to open
fields.2 The open fields doctrine of Hester seemed to conflict with a
later decision, Katz v. United States.- In Katz, the Supreme Court
held that the "Fourth Amendment protects people, not places."'4
The Court in Katz held the proper test of fourth amendment pro-
tections to be whether an individual has a reasonable expectation
of privacy which he justifiably relied upon.' In order to end the
uncertainty in this area, the Supreme Court has announced its de-
cision in Oliver v. United States.
In examining the vitality of the open fields doctrine, this note
will consider the development of the doctrine, the controversy
caused by the Katz opinion, and the Oliver decision itself. Weak-
nesses in the majority's analysis will be discussed and alternative
approaches will be given. According to the Supreme Court in Oli-
ver, open fields are not entitled to fourth amendment protections,
nor are expectations of privacy within those fields deemed
reasonable.7
THE CASE
In Oliver v. United States, narcotics agents of the Kentucky
State Police received reports that marijuana was being raised on
Oliver's farm.8 Officers went to the farm and upon arrival drove
1. 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
2. Id. at 59.
3. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
4. Id. at 351.
5. Id. at 353.
6. - U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 1735 (1984).
7. 104 S. Ct. at 1741.
8. Id. at 1738. (note that Maine v. Thornton, 453 A.2d 489 (Me. 1982), cert.
granted, - U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 1520 (1983) is consolidated with Oliver v. United
1
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past Oliver's house to a locked gate with a "No Trespassing" sign."
The officers followed a footpath around one side of the gate and
continued down the road on foot."0 The officers walked several
hundred yards passing a barn and a parked camper. 1 At that
point, someone near the camper shouted, "No hunting is allowed,
come back here." The officers shouted that they were with the
Kentucky State Police but found no one when they returned to the
camper. 2 The officers resumed their investigation and located two
fields of marijuana over a mile from Oliver's home.' 3 The mari-
juana fields, surrounded by other land owned by Oliver, were not
accessible to the public and could only be seen by someone stand-
ing on Oliver's farm.'
Oliver was arrested and indicted for manufacturing a con-
trolled substance. 5 The District Court for the Western District of
Kentucky suppressed evidence of the discovery of the marijuana
fields and found that Oliver had a reasonable expectation that the
fields would remain private in light of the "No Trespassing" signs
and the locked gate.'6 In examining the highly secluded nature of
the marijuana fields, the court noted that these were not "open
fields" that invited casual intrusion."
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the dis-
trict court.'8 The court of appeals concluded that the open fields
doctrine enunciated in Hester was not impaired by Katz. 9 The
court reasoned that the Katz application of the fourth amendment
considered circumstances that could not have been contemplated
at the time the amendment was adopted, specifically the role of
the telephone in private communication. The court of appeals
stated that the open fields doctrine was compatible with Katz be-
cause people do not generally have a need for privacy in open
fields and that the property owner's common law right to exclude
States).
9. Oliver, 104 S. Ct. at 1738.
10. Id. o
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. United States v. Oliver, 686 F.2d 356, 358 (6th Cir. 1982).
14. Id.
15. 104 S. Ct. at 1738.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. 686 F.2d at 373.
19. Id. at 359.
20. Id.
254 [Vol. 7:253
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trespassers is insufficiently linked to privacy to warrant fourth
amendment protection.2'
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the
court of appeals.2" The Supreme Court concluded that the open
fields doctrine in Hester is consistent with the language of the
fourth amendment.2 The Court also stated that there can be no
reasonable expectation of privacy in open fields under the analysis
developed in Katz.' Like the court of appeals, the Supreme Court
noted that in the case of open fields, the general rights of property
protected by the common law of trespass have little or no rele-
vance to the applicability of the fourth amendment.25
BACKGROUND
The first clause of the fourth amendment providing, "the right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be vio-
lated," was held not to extend to open fields in Hester v. United
States.2 6 In Hester, the defendant was convicted of concealing dis-
tilled spirits.2 " Revenue officers concealed themselves fifty to one
hundred yards away from the defendant's residence and observed
Hester give another man a quart bottle. Pursuant to their observa-
tions and previously reported information, the officers approached
and arrested the defendant.2 8 At trial, the defendant objected to
the revenue officers' testimony concerning their observations of the
defendant but the lower court allowed the testimony.2 9 The defen-
dant appealed, contending that his fourth amendment rights were
violated, 0 but the Supreme Court held that the officers' testimony
was admissible even though the officers had no search warrant and
the observations were made from Hester's land.$' The Court noted
that a trespass on the defendant's land was of little consequence to
21. Oliver, 104 S. Ct. at 1739.
22. Id. at 1735.
23. Id. at 1744.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924).
27. Id. at 57.
28. Id. at 58.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
1984]
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a finding of illegal search and seizure.3 2 The Court held that while
special protection is given to persons, houses, papers, and effects,
that protection is not extended to open fields.13 The Court men-
tioned the existence of a distinction between an open field and a
house by noting that the difference is as old as the common law,
however, no explanation of the actual difference was given.34
The brief opinion of Hester was followed by Olmstead v.
United States.35 The Olmstead decision developed what came to
be known as the "constitutionally protected places" interpretation
of the fourth amendment.36 In Olmstead, government officers
secretly tapped telephone company lines and intercepted messages
concerning a conspiracy to distribute alcohol unlawfully. 7 The
taps were made in the basement of a large office building and in
streets near the houses of the conspirators. No trespass was com-
mitted upon any property of the defendants.3 8 The Court held that
there was no search and seizure in this case. 39 The Court found
that the language of the fourth amendment covers material things
such as the person, the house, papers and effects and may not be
extended to cover such things as telephone wires reaching into the
defendant's house. "° The Court held that the fourth amendment is
not violated unless there is an official search and seizure of a per-
son, his papers, or tangible material effects, "or an actual physical
invasion of his house or curtilage 41 for the purpose of making a
seizure.' 42
Out of Olmstead and Hester came a tremendous focus on
fourth amendment protection of property, yet the action of tres-
pass was not deemed a deciding factor in determining the legality
of a search.4' The Court in Olmstead also indicated that any area
past the curtilage would receive no fourth amendment protection."
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 59.
35. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 455-456.
38. Id. at 457.
39. Id. at 464.
40. Id. at 465.
41. Oliver, 104 S. Ct. at 1742 defines curtilage as, "the land immediately
surrounding and associated with the home."
42. 277 U.S. at 466.
43. Id. at 465; 265 U.S. at 58.
44. 277 U.S. at 466.
[Vol. 7:253
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In following cases, the curtilage test was used to determine fourth
amendment questions despite the lack of a formal definition of
curtilage in Olmstead.45
In United States v. Potts, curtilage was defined as "all build-
ings in close proximity to a dwelling, which are continually used
for carrying on domestic employment; or such place as is necessary
and convenient to a dwelling, and is habitually used for family
purposes.""" Such a definition is little help in distinguishing an
open field from curtilage. The Court in Hester noted that the dis-
tinction was as old as the common law yet failed to give example.",
In search of a workable definition of curtilage, the court in United
States v. Bensigner" cited numerous standards which dealt pri-
marily with distance from the main dwelling.4 9 The Bensigner
court concluded that the cases have resulted in a clear rule: "any
outbuilding or area within seventy-five feet of the house is within
the curtilage and any outbuilding or area further than seventy-five
feet is outside the curtilage." 50 With some guidance as to the defi-
nition of curtilage, the open fields doctrine of Hester and the pro-
tected places approach of Olmstead were interpreted broadly "in a
per se manner to any area outside the curtilage."'
This interpretation of the fourth amendment was drastically
changed by the ruling in Katz v. United States.52 Katz specifically
overruled the "constitutionally protected places" approach of Olm-
stead.53 The Court held, "the fourth amendment protects people
not places."5 In Katz, the government conducted electronic sur-
veillance of the defendant's telephone conversations in a public
telephone booth.5 The listening device was attached to the outside
of the phone booth. 6 The district court allowed the evidence of
45. Id. at 466; See United States v. Potts, 297 F.2d 68 (6th Cir. 1961);
United States v. Whitmore, 345 F.2d 28 (6th Cir. 1965) and United States v. Van
Dyke, 643 F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1981).
46. 297 F.2d 68 (6th Cir. 1961).
47. Hester, 265 U.S. at 59.
48. 546 F.2d 1292 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 930 (1977).
49. Id. at 1296. See infra Appendix A.
50. 546 F.2d at 1297.
51. Note, Katz In Open Fields, 20 AM. CRiM. L. REV. 485, 491 (1983).
52. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
53. Id. at 350.
54. Id. at 351.
55. Id. at 348.
56. Id.
1984]
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Katz's phone conversations and the court of appeals affirmed."
The defendant appealed to the Supreme Court alleging violation of
his fourth amendment rights. 58 After a rejection of the "constitu-
tionally protected places" approach, the Court held that fourth
amendment protections turn on whether an individual has a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy which he justifiably relied upon.5 9
The Court noted that since the fourth amendment protects per-
sons and not merely places, the amendment does not turn upon
the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given
enclosure.6 0
While the majority in Katz adopted an objective standard,
Justice Harlan, in his concurring opinion adopted a subjective ap-
proach to the fourth amendment."1 Justice Harlan noted that there
is a two-fold requirement, "first, that a person have exhibited an
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the ex-
pectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasona-
ble.' ",2 Justice Harlan, like the majority, recognized the plain view
exception to the protection of the fourth amendment.6 3
The Katz opinion drastically redefined fourth amendment
rights. Areas previously not protected now received protection pro-
vided the Katz test was met. 4 Under Katz, what an individual
"reasonably seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible
to the public, may be constitutionally protected."6 5
With the ruling in Katz, considerable doubt was cast upon the
continued vitality of the open fields doctrine of Hester. In Air Pol-
lution Variance Board of Colorado v. Western Alfalfa Corp.,6 6 the
Supreme Court supported the open field doctrine after Katz.6 7 In
that case, a health inspector entered upon the outdoor premises of
Western Alfalfa Corporation to do some testing of plumes of
smoke from the defendant's chimneys. The inspector entered no
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 353.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 360-61.
62. Id. at 361.
63. Id. See Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968). The Supreme Court
in Harris held that objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to
be in the position to have that view are subject to search and seizure.
64. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
65. Id. at 351-52.
66. 416 U.S. 861 (1974).
67. Id. at 865.
258 [Vol. 7:253
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part of the defendant's plant to make the inspection. 8 The evi-
dence did not show whether the inspector was on premises from
which the public was excluded. 9 The Court found that the inspec-
tor was well within the open field exception to the fourth amend-
ment approved in Hester.7
In United States v. Allen,7 1 the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals held warrantless aerial surveillance of the defendant's farm
to be lawful. 2 The court agreed that "a person need not construct
an opaque bubble over his or her land in order to have a reasona-
ble expectation of privacy regarding the activities occurring there
in all circumstances, 73 yet the court concluded that the defendant
had no reasonable expectation that his barn, vehicles and the
tracks leading from the barn would not be noticed by aerial sur-
veillance. 4 This ruling came despite the fact that the defendant
had warned trespassers and placed "No Trespassing" signs around
his ranch. 5
Despite Allen and Western Alfalfa's support of the Hester
concept, some courts have held searches of open fields to be unrea-
sonable.7 6 In State v. Brady,77 the Supreme Court of Florida ap-
plied Justice Harlan's two-prong test and found that the defendant
had an actual expectation of privacy in his open field and that his
expectation was one that society would accept as reasonable.7 8 In
Brady, law enforcement officers responding to a tip, undertook sur-
veillance of Brady's property. 9 In order to observe Brady's ranch,
officers crossed a dike, rammed through a gate, cut a chain lock on
68. Id. at 864.
69. Id. at 865.
70. Id.
71. 675 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir. 1981).
72. Id. at 1381.
73. Id. at 1380.
74. Id. at 1381.
75. Id. at 1377.
76. See State v. Brady, 406 So. 2d 1093 (Fla. 1981).
77. 406 So. 2d 1093 (Fla. 1981), cert. granted, 456 U.S. 988 (1982), cert.
dism'd in pt., judg't vacated in pt., - U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 2380 (1984). The writ of
certiorai as to defendant Brady was dismissed by the Court because the Circuit
Court of Florida, Martin County, accepted the the State's nolle prosequi. The
judgment as to the remaining respondents was vacated and remanded for further
consideration in light of Oliver. 104 S. Ct. at 2380.
78. 406 So. 2d at 1098.
79. Id. at 1094.
1984] 259
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another gate and cut or crossed posted fences.8 0 The Brady court
noted that the open fields doctrine cannot be used as carte blanche
for a warrantless search simply because the location searched is
not part of a dwelling or its adjacent curtilage.8 1 In view of the
ranch's secluded location, Brady's efforts to keep others away, and
society's interest in protecting its citizens' privacy when in their
homes and on their property, the court held that the protections of
the fourth amendment should be applied to Brady.2
In light of the continuing controversy concerning the vitality
of the open fields doctrine after Katz, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in Oliver.83 In the Oliver case, the Court analyzed the
open fields doctrine in light of the Katz opinion.
ANALYSIS
In Oliver, the Supreme Court explicitly reaffirmed the open
fields doctrine of Hester.84 The Oliver Court examined the special
protections of the fourth amendment."' The Court held that the
curtilage or land immediately surrounding and associated with the
home is accorded the same protections that attach to houses.8" The
Supreme Court did not extend fourth amendment protections to
open fields.87 In applying the fourth amendment to the facts in Ol-
iver, the Court utilized the objective test found in the Katz major-
ity opinion.8 8 The Court held that the fourth amendment does not
protect merely subjective expectations of privacy but only "those
expectations that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasona-
ble.'"89 The Court held that there can be no reasonable expecta-
tions of privacy in open fields.9 0 The Court chose this per se rule of
reasonableness over a case by case determination of reasonable-
ness.9 1 The Oliver decision also reaffirmed Hester by holding that
in the case of open fields, the common law property rights pro-
80. Id. at 1095.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1098.
83. Oliver, 103 S. Ct. 812.
84. 104 S. Ct. at 1740.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1742.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1743.
89. Id. at 1740 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967)).
90. Id. at 1744.
91. Id. at 1742-43.
[Vol. 7:253
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tected by the law of trespass have little or no relevance to the ap-
plicability of the fourth amendment.9 2
Despite its firm holding in Oliver,93 the Supreme Court made
several errors in the rationale behind its decision. The most promi-
nent errors include the following: the failure to define key terms,
the inconsistent application of the Katz test and the use of a per
se rule in determining reasonable expectations of privacy in open
fields. Many of these errors are pointed out in the dissenting opin-
ion by Justice Marshall.9 4
In forming its decision in Oliver, the Supreme Court empha-
sized certain terms from the fourth amendment and common law.
The terms effects, houses, curtilage and open fields were found to
be of particular importance. 5 The Court examined the history of
the fourth amendment and concluded that the term "effects" is
less inclusive than "property" and cannot be said to encompass
open fields.9 6 The Court noted that the distinction between houses
and open fields is as old as the common law.9 7 The Supreme Court
also noted that the common law considered curtilage98 to be part of
the home itself for fourth amendment purposes.9 9 The Court re-
ferred to curtilage as the land immediately surrounding and associ-
ated with the home.100 The Supreme Court held that the common
law, by implying that only the curtilage warrants the fourth
amendment protections that attach to the home, conversely im-
plies that no expectation of privacy legitimately attaches to open
fields. 01
Apparently, the Court in Oliver attempted to define open
fields by showing that they are not houses, effects or curtilage and
thus do not come under the protections of the fourth amendment.
This attempt failed because houses, effects and curtilage were
92. Id. at 1744.
93. Id. at 1737. The Supreme Court held there can be no reasonable expecta-
tions of privacy in open fields.
94. 104 S. Ct. at 1744 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 1740, 1742.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1742. The Supreme Court gave a common law definition of curti-
lage as "the area to which extends the intimate activity associated with the 'sanc-
tity of a man's home and the privacies of life.'" Id. at 1742 (quoting Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).
99. Oliver, 104 S. Ct. at 1742.
100. Id.
101. Id.
19841
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never properly defined. The Court mentioned that there were sev-
eral distinctions between these three terms and open fields but
never set out the distinctions. Curtilage was defined as the land
immediately surrounding and associated with the home. 10 2 This
definition fails to give a practical standard such as the seventy-five
foot rule found in Bensigner.103 The Supreme Court also failed to
supply a definition of open fields in Oliver. This failure is critical
because a specific definition of open fields is necessary to give law
enforcement officials guidelines as to what areas may be searched
without a search warrant.
The Supreme Court purported to apply the reasonable expec-
tation of privacy test found in Katz to the facts in Oliver.'" IncOn-
sistencies appear however in the Court's use of the test. This is
most apparent in the Supreme Court's emphasis of the distinction
between open fields and curtilage. Here the Court held that fourth
amendment protections do not attach to land outside of the curti-
lage.105 This holding seems to be very similar to the protected
places approach of Olmstead. The Olmstead Court noted that any
area beyond the curtilage was not a constitutionally protected
area.106 Olmstead was specifically overruled by Katz which focused
on privacy interest as the basis of fourth amendment questions."0 7
The Supreme Court also ignored part of the Katz decision
when it disregarded the importance of the steps taken by Oliver in
preserving his privacy. The Court in Oliver reasoned that because
open fields are accessible to the public and police in ways that a
home, office or commercial structure would not be, and because
fences and no trespassing signs do not effectively bar the public
from viewing open fields, the asserted expectation of privacy is not
one that society recognized as reasonable.10 8 The Court also noted
that the public and police may lawfully survey lands from the
air.109 This line of reasoning is contrary to the Supreme Court's
holding in Katz that "what a person seeks to preserve as private,
even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally
102. Id.
103. Bensigner, 546 F.2d at 1297.
104. Oliver, 104 S. Ct. at 1740-41.
105. Id. at 1742.
106. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466.
107. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
108. Oliver, 104 S. Ct. at 1741.
109. Id. See United States v. Allen, 675 F.2d at 1381 (9th Cir. 1981).
[Vol. 7:253
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protected."1 ' It is important to note that Katz required only a
reasonable expectation of privacy and not complete privacy." The
Supreme Court should have considered Oliver's efforts to secure
his privacy in determining whether his expectations of privacy
were reasonable.1
2
The Supreme Court erred in the adoption of the per se rule
that there can be no reasonable expectation of privacy in open
fields. The Court concluded that under a case by case approach,
police officers would have to guess before every search whether
landowners had erected fences sufficiently high, or had posted a
sufficient number of warning signs to establish a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy.13 The Court failed to consider how much time
would be lost by officers following the Court's per se rule in guess-
ing how far curtilage extended and where the open field began.
114
Application of the Oliver Court's per se rule appears impossible
due to the Supreme Court's failure to define the terms curtilage
and open fields.
By adopting a per se standard, the Supreme Court empha-
sized the needs of law enforcement. Apparently the Court forgot
its decision in Mincey v. Arizona."5 Mincey held that, "the mere
fact that law enforcement may be made more efficient can never by
itself justify disregard of the fourth amendment.""' A per se stan-
dard also comes dangerously close to the protected places approach
of Olmstead."7 The per se rule that open fields are not subject to
constitutional protection applies fourth amendment protections on
the basis of places and not on people's expectation of privacy."'
Overall, the majority opinion of Oliver has limited Katz which
held that the fourth amendment protects people not places. 119 This
is most evident in the Oliver Court's emphasis of the curtilage as
110. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (1967); Note, Katz In Open Fields, 20 AM. CRIM.
L. REv. at 494 (1983).
111. Id.
112. See Oliver, 104 S. Ct. at 1743. Oliver erected "No Trespassing" signs
and fences on his property.
113. Id. at 1742-43.
114. Id. at 1750 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
115. 437 U.S. 385 (1977).
116. Id. at 393.
117. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466 (1927).
118. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 353. The Katz decision holds that the fourth
amendment protects people not places. The per se rule of Oliver is contrary to
Katz.
119. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
1984]
11
Godley: Criminal Procedure - Oliver and the Open Fields Doctrine - Oliver
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1984
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
the cut off point of fourth amendment protections. The Oliver
Court's refusal to consider a landowner's steps in preserving his
privacy is contrary to Katz which examined what a person sought
to preserve as private. 120 Also, the adoption of a per se rule that
there can be no reasonable expectations of privacy in open fields
creates a standard impossible to follow and favors law enforcement
procedures over a property owners' fourth amendment rights. 121
Justice Marshall presented a well reasoned dissenting opinion
in Oliver. 22 The dissent emphasized a landowner's right to exclude
others from his posted land, the uses to which land is put and the
importance of boundary markers on a person's land. 23 Justice
Marshall noted the importance of common law property rights, the
violation of which can result in a prosecution for trespass. 124 The
dissent did not conclude that property rights are determinative of
fourth amendment protections, but simply used property rights as
a factor in determining whether an individual's expectations of pri-
vacy are reasonable. 125 Justice Marshall noted that one who law-
fully possesses property will have more of a reasonable expectation
of privacy by virtue of his right to exclude others from his prop-
erty. 128 The dissent also examined the uses to which property is
put in examining a landowner's privacy interest.'27 While the ma-
jority mentioned that there are few privacy interests in the growing
of crops, the dissent also considered privacy interests in agricul-
tural research and business, private wildlife refuges and even walks
taken by landowners in their posted open fields. 128 The dissent em-
phasized the term "posted" in determining whether a person's pri-
vacy interests in open fields are legitimate. Justice Marshall noted,
"[a] claim to privacy is therefore strengthened by the fact that the
claimant somehow manifested to other people his desire that they
keep their distance."'' 9 This distinction between posted open fields
120. Note, Katz In Open Fields, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REv. at 494 (1983).
121. See Mincey, 437 U.S. at 393. The Supreme Court held that, "the mere
fact that law enforcement may be made more efficient can never by itself justify
disregard of the fourth amendment."
122. Oliver, 104 S. Ct. at 1745, (Marshall, J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 1750.
124. Id. at 1748.
125. Id. at 1747.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1748.
128. Id. at 1748-49. The phrase "posted open fields" refers to open fields
marked with no trespassing signs.
129. Id. at 1749 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 7:253
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and non-posted open fields is most helpful in posing a solution to
the problems created by the majority's opinion in Oliver.
The open fields doctrine may be viewed from the broad ap-
proach taken by the majority in Oliver or from the more narrow
approach suggested in the dissenting opinion.130 The majority
adopted a per se rule as to reasonableness of expectations in open
fields regardless of whether those fields are open to the public view
or secluded. 3' As discussed above, this approach creates a number
of problems with the defense of common law trespass and one's
fourth amendment rights. The Katz opinion recognized the plain
view doctrine as enunciated in Harris v. United States."12 In Har-
ris, objects within plain view of an officer who has a right to be in
the position of viewing them are subject to search and seizure
without a warrant.'33 Through the use of this exception the more
narrow doctrine of open fields may be developed. In this narrow
approach the landowner's precautions in guarding his privacy are
extremely important. 34 Undeveloped land is generally deemed to
be open to the public if the landowner has not posted his bounda-
ries. "'35 The court in Western Alfalfa held that an official may,
without a warrant, enter private land from which the public is not
excluded and make observation from that vantage point. 3 ' A more
narrow approach to the open fields doctrine would be that an indi-
vidual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in a field which is
open and accessible to the public. 3 7 This approach would require a
case by case determination by police as to whether the precautions
taken by an owner would entitle him to a reasonable expectation of
privacy. As noted before, this would impede police officers no more
than a determination of where curtilage ends, the test now used in
the broad approach adopted by the majority. 13 8 By using the nar-
row approach to open fields, a pure Katz test could be applied be-
130. Id. at 1750-51. Note, Katz In Open Fields, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REV. at 492
(1983).
131. 104 S. Ct. at 1737.
132. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357; 390 U.S. 234 (1968).
133. Harris, 390 U.S. at 236.
134. 104 S. Ct. at 1749 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448
U.S. 98, 105 (1980).
135. 416 U.S. 861 (1974); Oliver, 104 S. Ct. at 1749 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
136. 416 U.S. at 865 (1974).
137. Oliver, 104 S. Ct. at 1749-50 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Note, Katz In
Open Fields, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REV. at 496 (1983).
138. 104 S. Ct. at 1750-51 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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cause the plain view exception is accepted by Katz and the curti-
lage determination would be avoided. A Katz analysis using the
"accessible or visible to the public standard" as a factor in assess-
ing reasonableness would not require a precise definition of an
open field.139
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in Oliver held that an individual has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in open fields and is therefore
not entitled to the protections of the fourth amendment. 40 This
ruling came after Katz which greatly expanded fourth amendment
protections. The Supreme Court in Katz rejected the approach
that the fourth amendment protections only applied to certain ar-
eas such as houses or curtilage14 1 and held that the fourth amend-
ment protects people not places.14 2 As long as a person has a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy, the Court in Katz held that the
person is protected by the fourth amendment even if the person is
in an area accessible to the public. 43 The Court in Oliver limited
the holding of Katz and revitalized the protected places approach
in Olmstead v. United States. In order to avoid a step backward in
fourth amendment protections, the Supreme Court should adopt a
narrow approach to the open fields doctrine. The narrow approach
to the open fields doctrine would recognize property owners' rights
of privacy on their land yet it would avoid many of the pitfalls of
the Oliver decision. The adoption of a narrow approach to the
open fields doctrine is more consistent with Katz v. United States
and the protection of fourth amendment rights.
T. Michael Godley
139. Note, Katz In Open Fields, 20 AM. CRiM. L. REv. at 505 (1983).
140. 104 S. Ct. at 1737.
141. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (1967).
142. Id. at 353.
143. Id. at 352.
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OPEN FIELDS DOCTRINE
APPENDIX -A
Case Outside Within
Curtilage Curtilage
Care v. United States,
231 F.2d 22 one long
(10th Cir. 1956). city block
Hassell, 336 F.2d
684 (6th Cir. 1964). 750 ft.
Atwell v. United States,
414 F.2d 137
(5th Cir. 1969) 750 ft.
United States v. Bensinger,
546 F.2d 1292
(7th Cir. 1976) 400 ft.
Fulibright v. United States,
392 F.2d 432
(10th Cir. 1968) 150-300 ft.
Hester v. United States,
265 U.S. 57 (1924) 150-300 ft.
Brock v. United States,
256 F.2d 55
(5th Cir. 1958) 150-180 ft.
Hodges v. United States,
243 F.2d 281
(5th Cir. 1957) 150 ft.
Janney v. United States,
206 F.2d 601
(4th Cir. 1953) 100 ft.
United States v. Minton,
488 F.2d 601
(4th Cir. 1973) 80-90 ft.
Walker v. United States,
225 F.2d 447
(5th Cir. 1955) 210-240 ft.
United States v. Mullin,
329 F.2d 295
(4th Cir. 1964) 75 ft.
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United States v. Capps,
435 F.2d 637
(9th Cir. 1970) 40-45 ft.
Wattenburg v. United States,
388 F.2d 853
(9th Cir. 1968) 20-35 ft.
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